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Abstract 
 
 
The recent movement to provide “patient-centered care” has been hailed as a 
progressive step forward in meeting the needs of the very diverse patient population of 
the United States.  The focus on patient-centered care has been embraced at all levels of 
American medicine: professional organizations, public advocacy groups, hospital 
administrators, medical school leadership, insurance carriers, and nursing schools.  But 
while the ideal of patient-centered care is universally endorsed, the ethical obligations it 
entails have only begun to be explored.  One of the most difficult circumstances in 
which to provide patient-centered care is in deep cultural conflict, where the values and 
priorities of the patient are in direct opposition to those of the clinical team.  Given the 
mandate to provide care that is “culturally and linguistically appropriate,” the author asks 
what obligations providers have to meet patient demands when it is inconvenient, 
challenging, or, at the extreme, offensive and antithetical to mainstream values.    
Bariers are examined that patient-centered care in such cases is disruptive to the 
work-flow of the service, requires acknowledgement of illegitimate values, or entails 
discriminatory practices that constitute a personal insult or affront to the provider.  The 
strategy invoked for this analysis is a search for common values that might provide a 
bridge between patients and providers in deep cultural conflict. The author concludes by 
responding to these important barriers to providing patient-centered care. 
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What “Patient-Centered Care” Requires in Serious Cultural Conflict 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Consider the impasse between the patient and the clinician in the following case: 
 
A male radiologist is called by the ED to perform an evaluation for an 
intra-uterine pregnancy. The patient has come to the ED with bleeding and 
abdominal pain.  The patient's beta-HCG is around 250.  When the radiologist 
arrives in the patient’s room, he finds her covered in a burqa, and the patient's 
husband explains that she needs to remain covered and that the male radiologist 
will not be allowed to perform the necessary exam. The patient says nothing. 
There appears to be no language barrier.  
 
In the context of the recent movement to provide “patient-centered care,” cases like this 
one present a serious challenge to the clinical team: what the patient – or at least the 
person speaking for the patient – considers necessary for her values to be protected is in 
direct conflict not only with the standard of care, but with the standard operating 
procedures in contemporary US medical settings.  The standard of care in a suspected 
ectopic pregnancy is a diagnostic vaginal ultrasound, and the standard operating 
procedure is that the clinician assigned to the case (of whatever gender) does the exam 
and the exam is performed in a hospital gown.  Against the backdrop of the already 
almost unmanageable clinical load in US emergency departments, what type of attention 
and accommodation does “patient-centered care” demand when that effort threatens to 
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cause significant strain in a service already stretched thin?  And even if certain 
accommodations can be made, is the extra effort ethically warranted? 
 
Patient-Centered Care: The New Mantra 
 
The movement of “patient-centered care” is now embraced at all levels of 
American medicine: professional organizations, public advocacy groups, hospital 
administrators, medical school leadership, insurance carriers, and nursing schools all 
invoke the concept as a mantra.  As just one example, the American Academy of Family 
Physicians, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American College of Physicians, 
and the American Osteopathic Association committed to patient-center care in their 2007 
“Joint Principles of the Patient-Centered Medical Home,”1 which the AMA voted to 
adopt in November 2008.2 There is hardly a statement issued about healthcare quality 
improvements that does not appeal to “patient-centered care” as the guiding principle and 
goal.  But as bioethicist Howard Brody points out in his recent critique of the field of 
bioethics, the more fundamental questions of what patient-centered care demands are 
often neglected in this movement.  Taking seriously the idea of the “medical home” and 
the deeper implications of the obligation of “hospitality” that it entails, he writes, “For all 
the good intentions of patient-centered care and the medical home, it may be too easy to 
become overly focused on which electronic-health-record program works best, or on how 
to get properly reimbursed for group meetings for diabetic care and education. What has 
to happen in a medical office so that patients feel welcomed on arrival and throughout the 
visit?”3  Extending this line of questioning into the in-patient setting, we need to ask 
what patient-centered care obligates us to, especially if we are to make good on the 
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promise of the joint-principles that call for care that is “culturally and linguistically 
appropriate.”4   
As difficult as it may be to alter clinical practice to become welcoming and 
satisfying to patients in ordinary settings and situations, it is, of course, all the more 
challenging to achieve this when the needs of the patient conflict with the deeply held 
values and priorities of the providers.  But patient-centered care cannot be reserved only 
for the easiest, most compliant, most mainstream patients.  If patient-centered care 
requires attentiveness to patients’ needs that is culturally sensitive, we need to determine 
what obligations we have to meet those needs when it is inconvenient, challenging, or, at 
the extreme, offensive to mainstream values.  How far are we obligated to go in meeting 
the culturally based needs and demands of patients, given our pluralistic society that is 
getting more diverse all the time?   
 
Cultural Differences We Already Accommodate 
Some instances of cultural or religious difference do not meet with much 
provider-resistance in operationalizing patient-centered care.  In fact, providers are quite 
comfortable meeting religious or cultural demands in certain circumstances.  Consider, 
for example, widespread policies that recognize and respect diverse belief-systems, such 
as blood-transfusion policies for patients who are Jehovah’s Witness or accommodation 
of dietary requirements that are religion-based.  What sets these categories of cultural or 
religious demands apart from what is being asked of the provider and institution in the 
ectopic pregnancy case above is that the demands are not considered: 1) disruptive to the 
work-flow of the service; 2) illegitimate; or 3) ad hominem, i.e., perceived as a personal 
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insult or affront to the provider.  We find it acceptable – and even obligatory – to meet 
patients’ religious or cultural needs in situations that do not involve these three problems 
because we define accommodation as easy to achieve.  Let’s examine each of these 
problems in turn to see if they constitute an exclusion-criteria, whereby patient-centered 
care would ask too much of or exceed what could reasonably be expected from providers 
and institutions.  
Take the issue of (1) disruption to the work-flow first, using the examples of 
blood-transfusion policies or dietary requirements.  Accommodating cultural or 
religious demands in these instances is not thought to slow down productivity or hamper 
the delivery of care.  But that fact may be better explained by the structural 
incorporation of these demands into institutional and clinical practice than by the inherent 
ease of accommodating what is being requested.  Early on, when such demands were 
novel, they probably did cause significant interruption to clinical care, as providers and 
institutions struggled with how and whether to meet those demands.  Now they are 
simply included in the menu (sometimes, literally) of clinical care and patient services, 
with a standard protocol of accommodation, so they are not viewed as disruptive or 
inconvenient.  So one lesson to draw about our ability to meet patient needs in cases of 
cultural or religious difference is that when demands are relatively novel, they may cause 
interruption in a way that they might not, once a standard method for handling them is 
developed; we can’t refuse accommodation merely because a system for accommodating 
that request hasn’t yet been worked out. 
The second feature of the patient-demands we routinely accommodate is that they 
are not considered (2) illegitimate, but are implicitly sanctioned as worthy of that 
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accommodation.  But do we view these demands as legitimate because they are 
inherently reasonable and justifiable – religiously, culturally, or morally – or because 
providers are accustomed to these categories of demands?  There may not be anything 
more legitimate in the demands we are used to accommodating than the demands now 
being made by newer immigrant or religious groups.  Take the case of blood refusal in 
patients who are Jehovah’s Witness: every medical student learns about the right to 
refuse unwanted transfusions as one of the standard clinical ethics cases used in training.  
From the very beginning of medical school, then, clinicians see this aspect of the care of 
Jehovah’s Witness patients as standard and appropriate, even though the patient’s choice 
may result in a preventable death.  On the face of it, there would seem to be nothing less 
reasonable than losing a patient who has a very good prognosis, yet we define blood 
refusal in this population as a legitimate religious choice.  “Legitimate,” then, is not a 
matter of what can be justified on grounds of the dominant culture’s values, but what we 
have come to accept in the range of cultural or religious difference in the United States.  
And while it is laudatory that we respect the value of this religious group, it is also the 
case that there are somewhere between two and five times as many American Muslims 
(the religious subgroup that might don a burqa) as American Jehovah’s Witnesses.  
There are over 1 million Jehovah’s Witness “publishers” (as adherents call themselves) in 
the United States,5 which is a significant population; but there are somewhere between 
2.5 and 5 million Muslims, according to various estimates.6  While the American 
Muslim population is certainly not a monolithic group, and many American Muslim 
women do not wear a burqa as part of their religious observance, there are many that do.  
Given the American commitment to religious pluralism and tolerance, if one religious or 
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cultural belief or value is deemed legitimate and worthy of respect, then our default 
position must be that they all are. 
The third feature of the cultural differences that we routinely accommodate is that 
they are not (3) ad hominem with regard to the provider: the requests do not discriminate 
against certain categories of providers by race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.  The 
dominant culture’s commitment to equality and non-discrimination makes it difficult – on 
principle – to accommodate a demand that certain categories of clinicians be excluded 
from providing care.  It is often viewed as an affront to one of the most deeply cherished 
American values when a patient refuses to be treated by a fully qualified care-giver from 
a particular demographic.  When a patient refuses to be seen by a man, or a woman, or 
someone of a particular ethnicity or sexual orientation, it feels like prejudice and 
discrimination; when the patient-demand involves a dietary preference or refusal of 
certain treatment, it strikes no such nerve.  But this is precisely the kind of situation that 
reveals a profound cultural conflict: i.e., where one person’s values are incommensurate 
and incompatible with another’s.  It is in this very circumstance that the question about 
our obligations to patient-centered care becomes most urgent – and most challenging.  
Keeping these three problems in mind, let’s return to our case. 
 
Otherness versus Commonality 
 The women in the burqa and her husband seem to possess values incommensurate 
with those of the American mainstream.  Part of why incommensurable values seem to 
create an unbridgeable chasm between individuals is that, in such conflicts, each person 
is regarded as radically “other,” too different for the kind of kinship that engenders 
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empathy and understanding.  Deep cultural conflict always has as its starting point this 
focus on “difference,” on how “they” appear different from “us.”  It is hard to overcome 
the impasse that disparate values generate when the interpretation of radical difference 
stands.  But if underlying those very real cultural and religious differences is a 
commonality that runs deeper, the divide will no longer seem as wide.  I want to argue 
that, indeed, there is a set of universal values that underpins the claims of those whose 
views seem entirely different from ones own.  If we can see that what matters to “them,” 
matters to “us,” we won’t turn out to have the gaping differences we first appeared to 
have.  If we can see commonality and overlap in values, we not only can find solutions 
to patient-provider conflicts that are truly patient-centered, but we are more likely to 
think the effort worth our time. 
 Before we reconsider the “otherness” of the couple in the case we are discussing, 
it is worth laying bare the story we might tell about the situation that focuses wholly on 
difference.  There are a host of assumptions we might make that create a divide that 
seems very wide indeed.  We might think, for example: that because the husband is 
speaking for patient, he dominates and controls her; that the wife wants to participate in 
her care, but her husband is robbing her of her autonomy; that the husband is refusing 
necessary medical care based on a parochial modesty, putting his wife’s health (and even 
life) in jeopardy; that if he were not there, she’d consent to the exam; and, that they are 
uneducated, probably illiterate.  Keeping these possible assumptions in mind (again, we 
might make all or none of them), I want to present an alternative story about this couple 
that questions this interpretation of them.  
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 The framework that I want to use to tell this alternative story is a Kantian one that 
claims a foundation of universal values at the root of all of our particular and disparate 
moral commitments.  It is a moral framework articulated by the 18th century philosopher 
Immanuel Kant, whose central tenet was that all human beings share the same basic 
“Moral Law,” which Kant named the “Categorical Imperative.”7  Leaving the nuances 
aside, this moral claim amounts to a version of the age-old Golden Rule: “Do unto others 
as you would like them to do unto you.”8  Kant’s formulation of this principle is slightly 
more abstract, but the essentials are the same: “Act in a way that your action can be 
willed at the same time as a universal law of nature.”9  The Kantian view is an 
anti-relativistic position that holds that common, universal values are simply instantiated 
differently in different times and places; they all trace back to the very same principle of 
the Categorical Imperative.  When we see these very different instantiations, it is easy to 
recognize the differences that distinguish one set of values from another and miss entirely 
what is common between them.  But to see the differences without the common thread 
runs the risk of making those value-differences seem greater than they actually are – to 
the point where the other’s value system appears too foreign or alien to be considered 
legitimate and justified.  With that as the background, then, we can turn to our case to 
see if the underlying values and beliefs that anchor the couple’s demands are really that 
different from our own.  I want to look at three values that I will claim are universal and 
merely instantiated (or cashed out) differently: autonomy, informed consent, and bodily 
privacy. 
 
A Focus on Commonality: the Universal of Autonomy 
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To make the case that all human beings value autonomy, I want to offer a fairly 
general “working definition”: autonomy as the “right of self-governance.”  This value is 
not to be confused with “patient autonomy,” which is significantly different and quite 
specific: i.e., “the right of patients to make medical decisions and exert control over their 
medical care.” Patient autonomy is a very American concept, and I wouldn’t try to claim 
it as a universal.  Americans demand far more control over their medical 
decision-making than even other Western countries with comparable medical systems 
and healthcare.  The universal for autonomy, then, amounts to a more generic desire for 
self-governance.   
What is important to understand about autonomy, though, is that one can 
self-govern by making decisions, or one can self-govern by deferring to someone else’s 
superior expertise.  A satisfactory expression of my autonomy does not necessitate my 
always being the one literally making a particular decision.  Consider married or 
partnered couples: typically each person carves out spheres of expertise and one member 
of the couple tends to defer to the other on decision-making in that particular sphere.  
That deference to someone else’s expertise does not result in either party feeling 
compromised in their autonomy because superior expertise is a justified and rational 
ground for putting the responsibility of decision-making in another’s hands.  To 
willingly, voluntarily hand over a decision, though, is quite different from having the 
right to make a decision taken away against one’s will or express wishes.  When one’s 
autonomy is compromised in this way, one feels it acutely.  The feelings of being 
oppressed, forced, or coerced flag instances when one feels robbed of one’s autonomy as 
opposed to situations where one is gladly unburdened of a decision one feels unqualified 
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or incapable of making.  In those situations, one feels: relieved, unburdened,  freed, 
and grateful.  Take an institution that is not well-understood in mainstream American 
culture: the arranged marriage common in certain Middle Eastern or Asian cultures.  It 
is a very different circumstance when two parties enter into an arranged marriage with 
their respective consent, in contrast to an arranged marriage that goes against the will of 
one or the other party.  But in cases in which the two individuals do consent, not only 
have they exerted their autonomy in that consent, but they are likely to feel that this 
important life-decision was made in the appropriate way by the appropriate (re: 
competent, qualified) persons.  So while an arranged marriage is by definition an 
oppressive institution according to mainstream American values, it is not an oppressive 
institution to those who view it as the most prudent way to assure a happy and long-term 
union.  What seems oppressive and an affront to autonomy to one person may not seem 
oppressive or an affront to another.  We all have a vested interest in having our 
autonomy respected, but what that means across different people, cultures, and times can 
different significantly. 
Returning to our case, then, from the mainstream American view, we worry that 
the patient’s lack of participation in the decision-making about her illness indicates a 
thwarting of her autonomy.  Clearly there are grounds for fearing that she is not exerting 
any “patient autonomy” in this case, and we place high value on this species of autonomy.  
But the question is: does she?  There are two possibilities: she does want to exert her 
right to make her own medical decisions, but she is being prevented by her husband; or, 
she is comfortable (in fact, feels relieved) yielding to her husband on such matters, that is, 
she defers to him because of what she perceives to be his superior wisdom in this arena.  
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Thinking about our earlier assumptions in this case, we need to ask, then: is he her 
oppressor, robbing her of the power to make her own decisions; or, is he her protector, 
freeing her from the burden of the decision-making in this case?  Of course, I don’t 
know the answer to this question, but what I have tried to argue is that an assumption of 
malevolence on the part of the husband is premature and makes him into a moral villain 
without justification.  But there are stakes involved in this villainizing: it can undercut 
the providers’ resolve to work cooperatively with him in finding a patient-centered 
solution to this dilemma. 
 
A Focus on Commonality: the Universal of Informed Consent 
However one wishes to exert ones autonomy in medical decision-making – either 
by making the actual decisions or by deferring to someone else’s judgment – we all have 
a stake in those decisions being properly informed, reflective of our values, and 
legitimately endorsed.  In other words, there is a universal value of informed consent. 
The working definition I will use for “informed consent” is: “the patient or trusted 
advocate is adequately informed about the patient’s condition and treatment options, and 
s/he agrees to or chooses one of the proposed treatments/diagnostics.”  No one wants 
therapies or procedures done to them without either the patient’s knowing what they are 
and why, or the patient’s chosen “surrogate,” “advocate,” or “decision-maker” knowing.  
The trusted surrogate could be anyone: a spouse, children, a friend, or even a physician.  
If we assume in our case that we have a benevolent advocate in the husband, 
rather than someone who is working against his wife’s core interests and values, we will 
be a step closer to bridging the gap between “us” and ‘them.”  But are there grounds for 
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seeing him this way?  I believe there are.  First, he brought her to the ED for treatment, 
so he must have her healthcare interests in mind.  Second, from the bleeding, it was 
obvious to him that this was a gynecological problem, and yet that did not deter him from 
securing treatment. These facts are significant.  If we think about the Taliban days in 
Afghanistan, when women’s bodies couldn’t be viewed by men and women weren’t 
allowed to practice medicine, women simply died at home, unable to obtain treatment.  
The husband is hoping for an outcome that spares his wife this fate.  If the husband was 
not working towards a medical solution that safeguarded his wife’s health, then he would 
not have brought her in for care.  
 How would we typically work with a benevolent advocate who is in disagreement 
with the clinical team about what ought to be done medically?  Our first obligation 
would be to ensure that the surrogate is knowledgeable about the medical condition, 
prognosis, and treatment options.  What does he know about her condition?  Two 
essential elements of informed consent are “disclosure” – what has the decision-maker 
been told – and “understanding” – how much of that information has been adequately 
processed.10  Specifically in this case, does he understand that there is a possibility of an 
ectopic pregnancy?  Does he know what is at stake for his wife if that is the correct 
diagnosis?  Does he know that an ectopic pregnancy is potentially life-threatening?  
Does he know that the ultrasound is needed to diagnose an ectopic pregnancy? 
 
A Focus on Commonality: the Universal of Bodily Privacy 
Finally, the value that appears to be most at odds with contemporary American 
mores is bodily privacy.  Perhaps no other aspect of this case makes the couple look 
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more parochial (or dare I say “backward”) than this one.  And yet, as with the other two 
values of autonomy and informed consent, I want to argue that bodily privacy is a 
universal and there is less distance separating us than one might think.  As a working 
definition, I will claim that “bodily privacy” can be defined as: “a concern that parts of 
the body remain concealed from the view of strangers.”  In every culture, there is a 
distinction made between the “public” and “private” body.  All cultures draw a line 
between what parts of the body are permitted to be seen and what parts are not permitted 
to be viewed by the public eye.  And, all cultures draw lines demarcating what 
constitutes the “public eye” and in what contexts body parts can be seen and by whom. 
In this case, the woman adheres to an institution called Purdah, which literally 
means “curtain” (written in Persian and Urdu as: هﻩدﺩﺮﭘ, and in Hindi as:     ).  It is the 
practice of preventing men from seeing women through both physical segregation and the 
covering of the woman’s body.11  It is practiced in parts of the Middle East, Pakistan, 
and India.  If you are a woman living under Purdah, then only close male relatives and 
other women would have seen even your hands, eyes, arms, neck, face, and hair. The 
Burqa is the garment women often wear when they are living under Purdah.  To 
understand the context of this woman in the ED, we need to think about the relationship 
of Purdah to the American teaching hospital.  Think how casual we are in a teaching 
hospital about the number of people who interact, exam, question, and simply view a 
patient in that setting (e.g., triage nurse, other nurses, medical students, residents, 
phlebotomists, ED techs, attending, specialists, their residents – the list goes on and 
on…).  If we give a conservative estimate, the number of individuals interacting with 
the patient once in the examination room could be 10-15.  How many of these 
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individuals would have been men? Conservatively, let’s put the figure at 5-10.  Now 
imagine what it is like to have this experience: it is the first time any part of your body is 
exposed to a man not related to you, and suddenly various parts of your body are viewed 
by 5 (or more) men in a short period of time.  By the time radiology is called, the male 
resident may be the 5th (or 10th) man to come into the room.  
The natural objection to any attempt to put ourselves in her shoes is that it seems 
too far a stretch to try to imagine this experience.  We would likely respond by saying 
that we can’t even imagine having this level of bodily modesty.  We think of ourselves, 
in the dominant American culture, as too board-minded to have concerns like this.  In 
the context of medical care, we perceive ourselves as understanding that the body needs 
to be exposed and examined in order for us to safeguard our own health.  We might 
conclude, then, that we can’t feel or experience what this woman feels.  
To counter the assertion that we are “above” such parochial concerns, I want to 
take us on a “Thought Experiment,” where we can take a turn being a “them” in that 
“us-them” dichotomy.  Philosophers use thought experiments to give insight into a 
problem that we might be otherwise blinded from seeing because we sit too close to it.  
The strategy of a thought experiment is to ponder through a parallel situation to the 
original one being considered and then analogize the insights gained there back to 
original problem.  For this thought experiment, I want to take us to Germany, to a 
typical gynecology practice.  
If you were a typical patient coming for an appointment for an annual 
gynecological exam, the nurse would escort you to a room with a curtained area in the 
corner, with a stool on which to place your clothes.  The nurse would instruct you to 
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take off all of your clothes and come to the examining table, placing your feet in the 
stirrups. And then the nurse would leave. No gown or drape would be offered.  The 
gynecologist (the “Frauenarzt”) might be in the room while you disrobe and walk to the 
table, or typically he would come in once your feet were already in the stirrups.  (There 
are more women now entering the field of gynecology, but there are still more men in the 
specialty than women). There would be no nurse is present for the exam. The exam, 
health history, and post-exam discussion would be conducted with you naked in front of 
the physician.  Putting yourself in this exam room, how would you feel?  Do any of the 
feelings from this possible list describe it: embarrassed, vulnerable, ashamed, mortified, 
humiliated, violated, or powerless?  Now to exacerbate a situation already difficult for 
an American patient, imagine that there had been 5 male clinicians (or more) who had 
come into the room at various times during your appointment and were involved in 
different aspects of your care… 
A powerful objection one might immediately raise to this thought experiment is 
that the two cases are not analogous: the experience of an American woman in a German 
gynecology practice is not the same as the experience of a Muslim woman living under 
Purdah in an American ED.  The objection would run: the level of exposure is not at all 
comparable in the two cases, so no insight can be gleaned and applied from the one case 
to the other: in the Germany case, there is complete bodily exposure; in the burqa case, 
there is almost no exposure.  The rejoinder to this objection is that the level of exposure, 
relative to our respective cultural boundaries, is exactly the same.  In each culture, the 
“public vs. private body” is simply demarcated by different standards.  Great care is 
taken in every culture to protect the “private body,” but we merely define this differently 
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in different places.  When those culturally-prescribed boundaries of privacy are crossed, 
the patient acutely feels the violation of those boundaries.   
What constitutes the “private body” in these three cultures: in Germany, in the 
dominant US culture, and in cultures with the institution of Purdah?  The line between 
the “private” and “public” body is drawn by what parts of the body are allowed to be 
viewed in ordinary or commonplace public settings.  We might name these three lines as 
the “Sauna Standard” in Germany, the “Bathing Suit Standard” in the US, and the “Burqa 
Standard” under Purdah.  In Germany, the “Sauna Standard” gives us a good 
understanding of how liberal the culture is with the “public” body: public saunas are 
almost universally mixed gender, and full nudity in the sauna is the norm; in fact, nudity 
is often strictly enforced in saunas because it is considered to be most hygienic.  It is 
then no wonder that in the practice of medicine this same approach to nudity is used: the 
practice of gown-less exams mirrors bathing-suit-less sauna participation exactly.  In 
contrast, in the practice of American medicine, the hospital gown utilizes the “Bathing 
Suit Standard.”  Consider the body parts that are routinely exposed in someone wearing 
a hospital gown: hands, arms, neck, face, hair, back, legs, feet – the exact body parts 
revealed by a bathing suit and a level of exposure allowed to be viewed on any beach or 
pool in the US.  Returning then to our case, none of these body parts are included in the 
“public body” for a woman living under Purdah.  On the “Burqa Standard,” the level of 
exposure in a hospital gown is just as much a violation of bodily privacy as the “Sauna 
Standard” is for us.  It is not any more surprising that this conservative Muslim woman 
would resist wearing a hospital gown than that an American woman would insist on a 
drape or gown at a German gynecology visit.   
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 Now let’s reconsider the husband’s insistence on his wife staying cloaked in the 
burqa.  Don’t the power dynamics of medicine make it hard for patients to speak up 
when they feel humiliated or vulnerable?  Wouldn’t many of us wish for an advocate 
who would protect our interests and priorities in a situation like the German 
gynecological exam?  Many of us would consider a partner or spouse a hero for 
advocating for us about such a sensitive matter.  So once again, we need to ask whether 
the husband is the oppressor, preventing her from getting the care she needs, or her 
protector, safeguarding her interests and values when she feels powerless to do so.  
  
What Might Patient-Centered Care Look Like in This Case? 
With this new focus on the commonality between us and this couple – 
recognizing an overlap in our common core commitments to autonomy, informed consent, 
and bodily privacy – is it now possible to move past “us vs. them” thinking?  Despite 
culturally relative instantiations, these different needs and demands are variations on the 
same values.  How do we deliver patient-centered care that honors their values, while 
providing good medical care, given the possible limitations to what a busy, over-stretched 
ED can offer?   
If our dual-goal is to safeguard her health while safeguarding her values, we can 
take each of the three values in turn to see how we could best meet her needs.  Starting 
with autonomy: whether she wishes she could exert control over her own medical care 
but is being prevented, or whether she gratefully defers to her husband, this is the 
marriage (and culture) she is in and he appears to be the decision-maker.  Ideally she 
could be asked whether she wants to speak to the clinical staff without her husband 
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present, but it is hard to imagine her saying “yes:” on either reading – that he is her 
oppressor or protector – she will be returning to this marriage when this healthcare crisis 
is past.  But our role in healthcare is not to change cultures, and, short of addressing 
abuse, it isn’t to change marriages. 
Then, with her implicit consent that he is the surrogate decision-maker, the 
husband needs to be given a carefully, sensitively described picture of the medical facts 
of his wife’s case, the risks she is facing, the purpose of the diagnostics, the consequences 
if an ectopic pregnancy is missed.  Of course, this suggestion does not sound any 
different from what any clinician would do in any circumstance, and in the essentials, it 
isn’t.  But there is a world of difference between discussing care-options with a 
surrogate seen as unreasonable and self-interested and negotiating care with a surrogate 
thought to have his loved one’s best interests at heart.  As all professional negotiators 
know, a conversation to resolve a serious conflict proceeds very differently when both 
parties view each other as having the same values and goals.  In talking respectfully 
with the husband, we might solicit his concerns, ask for information about the parameters 
he sees for her care, and ultimately request his help. 
 Protecting her need for a high level of bodily privacy means working with her to 
minimize the amount of bodily exposure she has and controlling the gender of the 
providers she comes in contact with.  Can the number of people who interact with this 
patient be minimized?  Can a female ED resident or attending do the pelvic exam?   
Can a female tech or radiologist do the pelvic ultrasound?  Can these exams be done 
while she is still wearing the burqa, using additional drapes?   
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I started this essay with three barriers to meeting patient-demands, namely,  
those that are not considered: 1) disruptive to the work-flow of the service; 2) 
illegitimate; or 3) ad hominem.  The bulk of my argument tried to address (2) the 
concern that this couple’s request was illegitimate.  Returning to the first and third 
concern, providers may resist accommodating this couple’s demands because (1) they 
feel burdensome to an already taxed ED service, and (3) because they feel like the kind of 
ad hominem request that violates the American ideal of non-discrimination.  The 
objection regarding disruption seems easy to meet: if a routinized method is developed 
for meeting these demands, it will take no more time to fulfill these demands than any 
other standard special request.  More troubling for many providers is the last concern, 
the “in principle” objection to bowing to any kind of discriminatory request for a certain 
demographic of clinician.  My response to this objection (perhaps controversially) is 
that ignoring or dismissing the couple’s request request is tantamount to being complicit 
in a kind of psychological or emotional assault, so concerns about discrimination must 
yield here.  It naïve to believe no harm will come to this patient from being forced to 
submit to a strange man seeing her naked body.  The duty “to do no harm” forbids this 
type of injury to patients, and it trumps the otherwise governing value of 
non-discrimination.  And what if there are no female techs, radiologists, ED residents or 
attendings on the service?  Well, as Kant argued persuasively, we cannot be obligated to 
do what is impossible,12 so if there are no available female providers, then the patient 
needs to be offered the option of transferring to another hospital or accepting the 
providers at hand.  Patient-centered care can only ever obligate us to the real options we 
have to offer.   
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Summing Up 
 Patient-centered medicine is not only a rejection of “my way or the highway” 
thinking about patient care: it is also a commitment to meeting patients on their own 
terms, respecting the values they come with to the clinic. We need to enhance our focus 
on commonality, rather than on difference, especially as the United States becomes more 
diverse.  Patient-centered medicine must avoid the dichotomous thinking of “Us vs. 
Them” – not only because it is a false dichotomy, but because it lessens our resolve to 
meet patients where they are.  Patient-centered care is a progressive step forward in 
meeting the needs of patients in US clinics, and all patients are deserving of it. 
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